The
Ukrainian president is ousted. People gather in the streets of Ukraine to oppose the
closer relationship he wanted with Russia. Russia feels a direct threat to its
naval base in Sevastopol and the ethnic Russians who dominate the population of
the Crimea and, most importantly for Russia; it feels a threat to its only
all-weather seaport.
Looked
at in those terms alone, Vladimir Putin may even be seen as exercising
restraint in sending “unmarked” troops to Crimea to “stabilize” the situation
without “officially” invading the country, and thus requiring a military
response from Europe and the US. We need
to add to this, though, that Putin has always wanted to regain the power and
respect he felt in the (now defunct) Soviet Union, not to mention his feeling,
shared by many in the West, that a powerful Soviet Union was, ultimately, a
stabilizing force in the world (if we discount the Cold War). Finally, we need
to add into the mix that Russia has a nearly genetic paranoia about being
surrounded by (potential) enemies, and we have a reasonable snapshot of the
picture from the viewpoint of the Kremlin.
So,
with that being said, what can be done? First, we need to understand that this
is more of a political situation than a military one; we’re playing chess, not
checkers. That means that we need to find a way, if possible, for all sides to
get most of what they want while still leaving our opposition (Russia, in this
case) a graceful way out of the situation. Here is what I would propose to
Putin (thought the back channels, of course, not for public consumption) if I
were the President of the United States.
First,
the new Ukrainian government needs to understand that the rest of the world
will not fight to preserve an unbalanced status quo. The Crimea was only ceded
to the Ukraine as part of an agreement in 1954 and most of the citizens of the
Crimea are ethnically Russian, and speak Russian as their primary language.
They want
to be Russian. Secondly, the remainder of the Ukraine wants closer ties with
Europe and the US, and cringes at the thought of being dominated by Russia,
like they were as part of the Warsaw pact. Thirdly, there would never be
sufficient economic sanctions put into place to make Russia act against its
perceived interests because they are a major trading partner of a large part of
the world including, increasingly, the US. Finally, neither Russia nor the US
wants to meet each other in a “hot” war in the Ukraine because they do not have
the conventional power to defeat us, and we understand that their only option,
if they feel sufficiently threatened is the nuclear (literally) option.
Therefore,
we would agree that:
- 1. Both sides would spend the next two weeks
blustering and threatening so that their respective populations and political
“hardliners” would be satisfied. Once that phase was complete,
- 2.
Ukraine would cede Crimea and the ethnically
Russian part of eastern Ukraine to Russia,
- 3. Ukraine would be invited to join NATO, thus
ensuring them that in return for ceding the territory to Russia, their new
geographic boundaries would be protected by the mutual defense pact with NATO.
In
the preceding scenario, Putin would claim a “win” for Russia, at home, because through
threat of force, they had Crimea and part of Ukraine ceded to them (despite the rest of the world "knowing" that the threat of Russian force was not the deciding factor). Obama would
claim a “win” (at home) because he turned up the rhetoric and rattled the American saber
and, thereby, forced Putin and Russia to “back down,” by preventing and
guaranteeing no further action on their part with regard to Ukraine. The Crimea
and the ethnically Russian population of Ukraine would win by becoming part of
Russia, as they wanted. Ukraine would win because NATO protection and a closer (and
uncontested) economic alignment with Europe and the US was what they wanted in the first place and, the World wins because we would have averted a
potential major crisis.
THE DEFENSE RESTS!